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PEN REGISTERS
investment in a stock of computers for leasing. 109 This requirement is in fact
the major capital entry barrier into the manufacturing market. 110 Thus, by
restricting the growth of strong leasing companies, IBM maintains signifi-
cant capital entry barriers in the manufacturing market.
These additional and more subjective factors support the conclusion
that IBM violated the antitrust laws by engaging in a socially undesirable
price squeeze. It should be remembered, however, that when predatory
pricing analysis is opened to considerations beyond the monopolist's costs
the advantages of the cost-based rules are diminished, and the analysis leans
toward the "intrinsically speculative and indeterminate" 111 approach such
rules are designed to avoid.
The problem of determining standards for a monopolist's price behav-
ior is compounded when that behavior occurs on successive market levels,
as in the Greyhound case. Clear and precise standards are needed to guide
the monopolist and the courts. Such standards are available in the form of
cost-based predatory pricing rules, which can be applied to the vertically
integrated monopolist. The court of appeals in Greyhound overlooked the
possibility of such an application, relying on general definitions of mono-
polization to find a prima facie case of monopolization. The court over-
looked or ignored the crucial issue of IBM's costs as a measure of the
propriety of its prices; IBM's potential defenses based on cost considera-
tions went unnoticed, leaving open the unhappy possibility that even weaker
cases will be approved in the future. The Greyhound court thus decided, for
badly flawed reasons, to enter the economic thicket of judicial supervision
of IBM's pricing policies.
MICHAEL L. BALL
Criminal Procedure-Pen Registers: Compelling
Third Party Assistance Under the All Writs Act
A pen register is a mechanical device that records the outgoing num-
bers dialed on a monitored telephone, but that does not overhear oral
communications or record whether a call is actually completed.1 Because
109. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 57-60.
110. Id.;J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 41.
111. Areeda & Turner, supra note 65, at 897.
1. A pen register is attached to a telephone line usually at a central telephone office. In
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pen registers, unlike wiretapping and eavesdropping devices, 2 are not gov-
erned by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title III),' the manner of their use has remained a matter within the
discretion of the federal courts. In United States v. New York Telephone
Co.4 the United States Supreme Court considered the question whether a
United States District Court may properly direct a telephone company to
provide federal law enforcement officials the facilities and technical assist-
ance necessary for the execution of its order authorizing the use of pen
registers. The Court held that the district court had power under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (rule 41)1 to authorize the use of pen
registers, and power under the All Writs Act6 to order the telephone
company to furnish assistance. Although the New York Telephone Co.
decision is consistent with recent courts of appeals rulings7 and with
congressional action concerning electronic surveillance under Title 1II, 8 it
the case of a rotary dial telephone, it records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the
number dialed; for incoming calls, it records a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not
identify the number from which the incoming call originated. See United States v. Caplan, 255
F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). In the case of a touch tone telephone, the device (TR-12)
prints the digits dialed in Arabic numerals. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1039-40 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd
mem., 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
2. "Wiretapping" is the interception of communication by means of a physical connec-
tion with a communications system at a point between the sender and the receiver; "eavesdrop-
ping" refers to the interception of communication by means of a mechanical or electronic
device that is not physically connected with the communications system. 74 AM. JUR. 2d
Telecommunications §§ 211, 216 (1974). See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 73-78
(1967).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (1968). Section 802 of Title III amended
part I of title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter entitled "Chapter 119-Wire
Interception and Interception of Oral Communication" (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970)). Sec-
tion 803 of Title III amended § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat.
1064 (formerly codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), to conform with the new chapter, which was
intended to be a comprehensive electronic surveillance statute. Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1970)). See generally S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-109, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177-97 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See also text
accompanying notes 19-30 infra.
4. 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977).
5. Rule 41(b) authorizes federal magistrates and state judges to issue a warrant to search
for and seize any "(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal
offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3)
property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a
criminal offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). See also text accompanying notes 32-37 infra.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970); see text accompanying note 48 infra.
7. See Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716
(1978); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). But see Application
of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
8. Congress amended Title III in 1970 by adding the following language to § 2518(4):
An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall, upon
request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier . . . shall
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raises serious questions about the scope of authority conferred by rule 41
and the All Writs Act.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued an order authorizing agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to install and use pen registers on two telephones upon finding that
there was probable cause to believe that the two telephones were being used
in connection with an illegal gambling operation. 9 The order also directed
the New York Telephone Company (the Company) to furnish the FBI" [a]ll
information, facilities, and technical assistance" necessary to employ the
pen registers unobtrusively, 10 and it directed the FBI to compensate the
Company at prevailing rates." The Company provided the FBI with the
information it needed to install the pen registers, but it refused to lease the
lines to the FBI that were required to install the pen registers in an incon-
spicuous location, away from the building containing the telephones. 12 The
district court denied the Company's motion to vacate that part of the order
directing it to provide assistance, and the Company appealed. 13
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that part of the
orddr authorizing the use of pen registers, concluding that pen registers are
not subject to the provisions of Title m and that district courts have power,
either inherently or as a "logical derivative" of rule 41, to order pen register
surveillance upon a showing of probable cause. 14 The Second Circuit,
furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of inter-
ference with the services that such carrier . . . is according the person whose
communications are to be intercepted.
Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 21 l(b), 84 Stat. 654 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(1970)). The amendment provides further that such carrier be compensated at prevailing rates.
d. It was passed following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Application of the United States for Relief, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970), which held
that, absent specific statutory authority, a district court was without power to compel a
telephone company to provide assistance in the interception of wire communications conducted
pursuant to Title III. Id. at 644. See also note 91 infra.
9. 98 S. Ct. at 367.
10. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 957 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). The language that the
district court used in its order tracked the language of the 1970 amendment to Title III.
Compare 538 F.2d at 957 with note 8 supra.
Ii. 98 S. Ct. at 367.
12. The Company advised the FBI to string its own wires from the "subject apartment" to
another location where the pen registers could be installed, but the FBI determined that this
could not be accomplished without alerting the suspects and jeopardizing the investigation. Id.
13. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 416 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y:), aff'd
in part and rev 'd in part, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). The Second Circuit denied the Company's motion to stay the pen
register order pending appeal, and the Company then provided the leased lines. 98 S. Ct. at 368.
14. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 960 (2d Cir. 1976),
noted in 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 538 (1977). The court concluded that the power to order pen register
surveillance is the equivalent of the power to order a search pursuant to a search warrant, and is
19781
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however, reversed that part of the order directing the Company to provide
facilities and technical assistance. It assumed, arguendo, that a district court
has authority to compel assistance by the Company, but concluded that "in
the absence of specific and properly limited Congressional action, it was an
abuse of discretion for the District Court to order the Telephone Company to
furnish technical assistance." 15 The Supreme Court interpreted the Second
Circuit's holding "as generally barring district courts from ordering any
party to assist in the installation or operation of a pen register." 16 It agreed
"that the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not
without limits,' 1 7 but the Court concluded that the district court was
authorized by the All Writs Act to order the Company to provide technical
assistance to implement the pen register order.'18  ",
The decision of the Supreme Court in New York Telephone Co. can
best be understood in light of the statutory authority upon which it relies-
Title III, rule 41 and the All Writs Act. Title III was intended to be a
comprehensive electronic surveillance statute, 19 prohibiting all wiretapping
and other types of electronic surveillance 20 except by law enforcement
officials 2' investigating specified crimes22 and acting pursuant to rigid pro-
cedures 23 under judicial supervision. 24 Title III, however, authorizes only
those orders "authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral
communication. "25 "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the
thus subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment. Because the district court issued the
order upon a showing of probable cause, the court held that it had been properly granted. Id.
15. Id. at 961. Judge Mansfield dissented on the grounds that the district court had power
under the All Writs Act to compel the Company to provide assistance and that it did not abuse
its discretion in exercising that power. He noted that the result of holding that the Company
cannot be directed to provide assistance in installing pen registers might result in more intrusive
electronic surveillance for the reason that the Company can be required to provide assistance in
installing a wiretap under Title III. Id. at 964 n.1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
16. 98 S. Ct. at 372.
17. Id.
18. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens filed an opinion
dissenting in part in which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, and in which Justice
Stewart joined in part. Justice Stevens took the position that Congress has not given district
courts the power either to authorize the use of a pen register under rule 41 or to require private
parties to assist in carrying out such surveillance under the All Writs Act. He concluded that
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and because those limits should be
adhered to strictly when a court purports to authorize and implement the invasion of an
individual's privacy, the Court's "rush to achieve a logical result" in this case must await
congressional action. Id. at 375-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
19. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 66-67, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 2153-54. See also Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveil-
lance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 657 (1968).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
21. Id. § 2516.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 2518.
24. Id. § 2519.
25. Id. § 2518(1) (emphasis added).
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contents of any wire or oral communication." 26 Because pen registers do
not "aurally" 27 acquire the "contents" 28 of any communication, they are
not covered by Title JlI;29 each court of appeals that has considered the
matter has so concluded. 3° The question presented, therefore, concerns the
source of the district courts' authority to issue pen register orders. The
courts of appeals have found a basis for that authority either in the "inherent
power" of a district court 31 or in rule 41.
Rule 41(b) authorizes a federal magistrate to issue a warrant to search
for and seize, among other things, "property that constitutes evidence of the
commission of a criminal offense.''32 The difficulty in using the rule to
authorize the issuance of a pen register order is that the evidence seized by
means of the pen register-numbers dialed on a telephone-does not fit the
definition of the term "property." Rule 41(h) defines property "to include
documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects." , 33 Thus, strictly
construed, rule 41 does not purport to authorize warrants to search for and
seize "nontangibles" such as evidence gained as a result of pen register
surveillance. 34 Of the four courts of appeals that have invoked rule 41 as
authority for the issuance of a pen register order, three have done so by
26. Id. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
27. "Aural" is not defined in Title III. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY gives the
following definition: "1. Of or pertaining to the organ of hearing. 2. Received or perceived by
the ear."
28. "Contents" is defined as "includ[ing] any information concerning the identity of the
parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1970).
29. The Senate report on Title III indicates that pen registers were intended to be excluded
from coverage: "The proposed legislation is not intended to prevent the tracing of phone calls.
The use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible. . . . The proposed legislation is
intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not the means of communica-
tion." SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 2178 (citation omitted). Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit cited this language in
support of their conclusion that pen registers are not covered by Title III. See 98 S. Ct. at 370;
In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. See Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); cases cited note 7 supra. But cf. United States v.
Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (pen register used in conjunction with wiretap is
authorized by Title III wiretap order).
31. Both the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits have suggested that the inherent authority of
a district court to issue a pen register order has been "necessitated" by the special nature of
electronic communications. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243,245
& n.5 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809, 811 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1976).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b); see note 5 supra.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h) (emphasis added).
34. But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) (dicta that rule 41(d)
would not require prior notice of an otherwise constitutionally valid order authorizing electron-
ic surveillance); 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 661, at 21 (1969) (rule 41
should be read as applying to verbal statements).
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analogy. 35 Only the Sixth Circuit, in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v.
United States,36 actually held that rule 41 gives district courts that power.
37
The question whether a district court is empowered to issue a valid
order does not arise in most cases of electronic surveillance, because Title
11 expressly authorizes the interception of wire and oral communications
subject to the procedures therein; 38 however, because pen registers are
outside the scope of Title I, the authority to issue an order for their use
must be found, if at all, in the pre-1968 power of a federal magistrate to
order electronic surveillance. 39 In Katz v. United States ,4 decided in 1967,
the United States Supreme Court indicated that a magistrate's power to order
electronic surveillance is equivalent to his power to issue a search warrant,41
and that such an order could properly issue if the manner of its issuance met
constitutional standards.42 Thus, unless Congress intended in 1968 to pro-
35. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243,245 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d
956, 959 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364
(1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 811 n.2, 813 (7th Cir. 1976).
36. 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). Michigan Bell Telephone Co. actually involved the use of
a "trapping" or "tracing" device, but the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rules applicable to
pen registers were controlling. Id. at 388. A trace determines the telephone numbers of calls
incoming to the monitored telephone. Id. at 388 n.5.
37. Id. at 389.
38. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
39. The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of electronic surveillance
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the Court held that neither the
fourth nor the fifth amendment barred admission into evidence of information obtained by
tapping defendants' telephone lines. Id. at 462, 466. Congress then enacted the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, § 605 of which prohibited the interception without authorization and
divulgence or publication of any wire or radio communication. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), enforced,
308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court applied the exclusionary rule to evidence offered in a federal
prosecution that was obtained in violation of § 605. 302 U.S. at 382; 308 U.S. at 340. The Court
considered electronic eavesdropping for the first time in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), and relied upon Olmstead in holding that there was no violation of the fourth
amendment because there was no physical trespass in connection with the eavesdropping. Id.
at 135. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), however, the Court held that
evidence obtained by means of a "spike mike"-a spike with a microphone attached inserted
into a party wall-was inadmissible because there was "actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area" in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 512. Finally, in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court held that "conversation" is protected by the fourth
amendment and that the use of electronic devices to capture it constitutes a "search." Id. at 51.
The Court then found that a New York statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping failed to
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 58-60; cf. Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 329 (1966) (evidence obtained by means of recording device authorized subject to
"precise and discriminate" procedures admissible). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, §
665.
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 354-56 & 355 n.16.
42. The Court indicated that electronic surveillance would be constitutionally permissible
under the following circumstances: law enforcement officials must obtain advance authoriza-
tion.by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause; they must observe the precise
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hibit all types of electronic surveillance except that expressly authorized
under Title rH,4 3 the permissibility of the use of pen registers arguably
depends solely on compliance with the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. This was in fact the conclusion reached by four Supreme Court
Justices in United States v. Giordano44 upon finding that pen registers are
not subject to the provisions of Title 1n. 45 Relying upon the specific
language of Justice Powell in Giordano, each court of appeals that has
directly confronted the matter has decided that the power to order pen
register surveillance is either a power analogous to that in rule 41 or the
power lodged in rule 41 itself .46 The power to order pen register surveillance
is a nullity however, when, as in this case, the telephone company refuses to
provide facilities and technical assistance. 47 Consequently, the lower courts
have looked to the All Writs Act for the authority to compel assistance.
The All Writs Act provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." 48 Because district courts are "courts established by Act
of Congress," the statute applies to them.49 It is primarily invoked by the
Supreme Court50 and the courts of appeals, 51 however, in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction; the power to grant a writ is characterized as an
appellate power. 52 The writs more commonly issued under the Act are writs
of mandamus or prohibition, 53 although the Act itself authorizes "all writs"
limits established by a specific order; and they must notify the authorizing magistrate of all that
is seized. Id. at 356. Those requirements were not met in Katz. Id.
43. Congress intended to prohibit the interception and disclosure of all wire or oral
communication except as otherwise provided in Title III. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90,
91, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2178, 2180. "Intercept" is a defined
term, however, and does not reach the use of pen registers. See note 29 supra.
44. 416 U.S. 505, 548 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 553-54 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court did not
reach the issue because it concluded that the evidence obtained by means of the pen register
was derived from an illegal wire interception. Pen register surveillance had been authorized by
extension orders following the initial illegal wiretap order. Id. at 533 n.19.
46. See cases cited in notes 35 & 36 supra.
47. The Second Circuit found that without the Company's technical assistance, the pen
register order would be "worthless." In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538
F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1976).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
49. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.26, at 278 (2d ed. 1975).
50. Id. 110.27.
51. Id. 110.28.
52. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3932, at 184 & n.3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
53. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 49, 110.26, at 278. For an excellent
summary of the All Writs Act and the power to issue a writ of mandamus, see Judge Friendly's
opinion in United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 709-13 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 917 (1972).
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and that language has been interpreted flexibly to include such writs as
common law certiorari and habeas corpus as well as injunctions .4
The language of the statute itself prescribes several limitations on its
scope. First, it authorizes only those writs that are "necessary or appropri-
ate." Although the common law writs upon which the Act is based were
considered "extraordinary remedies," 55 the Supreme Court has at times
used broad language in defining the scope of the Act,56 and the standard
against which its use must be tested is one of sound judicial discretion. 57 The
writ must also be "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The
Court has not interpreted that to mean agreeable to the usages and principles
of common or English law; 58 the limitation is, in effect, also one of judicial
discretion. 59 The most sharply defined limitation on the use of the Act is that
the writ must be "in aid of [the courts'] respective jurisdictions." This
means that the Act does not confer or extend a federal court's jurisdiction, 60
and that it can properly be invoked by a district court only with respect to
jurisdiction otherwise obtained. 61 Thus, the proper exercise of power under
the Act depends, first, upon whether the court invoking the Act has metthe
jurisdictional requirement and, second, upon whether the specific action
taken by the court constitutes an abuse of that power.
The threshold question that the Supreme Court addressed in New York
Telephone Co. was whether pen registers are covered under Title III. The
Court concluded they are not, 62 and in so concluding removed pen register
orders from both the authority of Title I and its rigid procedural safe-
guards. The conclusion that pen registers do not pose the same threat to
privacy as wiretapping and eavesdropping, and therefore need not be
54. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (court of appeals empowered
to temporarily enjoin consummation of merger pending FTC proceedings); United States Alkali
Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (Supreme Court empowered to review
district court order by writ of certiorari); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942) (court of appeals already having jurisdiction of proceeding empowered to issue writ of
habeas corpus).
55. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52, § 3933, at 213.
56. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the Court used the
following language: "Unless appropriately confined by Congress, a federal court may avail
itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the use of such historic
aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it." Id. at
273. This language has been widely quoted. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S.
Ct. at 372.
57. See Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943); Adams v. United States ex
reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
58. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1948).
59. Id. at 284.
60. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 49, 110.26, at 282-83.
61. Id. 1110.29, at 318; see Commercial Security Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456
F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1971).
62. 98 S. Ct. at 369.
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accorded the same safeguards, is supported by the Court's rationale-as
expressed in Berger v. New York63 and Katz-that the fourth amendment
protects oral communications. 64 Under that rationale, the question arises
whether the use of a pen register should be subject to the requirements of the
fourth amendment at all since the device does not overhear oral communica-
tions. In fact, the Court has never directly addressed that question65 and left
it unanswered in New York Telephone Co.66 If pen registers could be
employed without a warrant-like mail covers67 -then judicial authoriza-
tion would be unnecessary in the first place, and a district court would
presumably lack the requisite jurisdiction to invoke the All Writs Act to
order a telephone company to provide assistance. 68 The anomalous result
would be that the decision whether to allow a pen register to be used in a
particular case would be made by the telephone company rather than by a
federal magistrate. The Court avoided this problem in New York Telephone
Co. by assuming that the use of a pen register constituted a "search" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, 69 and it found authority for the
district court to order its use in rule 41.
63. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
64. In Berger, the Court held that "conversation" was protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 51; see note 39 supra. In Katz, the Court concluded that listening to and recording
petitioner's "words" constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 389 U.S. at 353; see note 42 and text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
65. The widely-quoted statement in Giordano that pen registers are subject to the require-
ments of the fourth amendment is in a separate opinion and is not part of the holding of the
case. See note 45 supra.
66. 98 S. Ct. at 369 n.7. It is arguable that the use of a pen register by law enforcement
officials violates the "justifiable" expectation of privacy that the person under investigation
has in using the monitored telephone, and that such an expectation of privacy is protected by
the fourth amendment. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (clarifying Katz).
But see Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement
Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1042-47 (1975) (fourth amendment does not bar the use of pen
registers); cf. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461 (1977) (use of "beepers"-electronic tracking devices-invades fourth amendment
rights in most cases and should be subject to statutory warrant requirements).
67. The post office conducts a mail cover by
furnishing the Government with the information appearing on the face of the envelope
addressed to the particular address: i.e., addressee, postmark, name and address of
sender (if it appears), and class of mail. The actual mail is delivered to the addressee
and only the letter-carrier's notation reaches the Government agency which requests
the mail cover.
United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953
(1971). Mail covers have been found to be outside the protection of the fourth amendment. See,
e.g., Lustinger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
68. Justice Stevens reasoned that "[i]f . . . the individual's privacy interest is not
constitutionally protected, judicial intervention is both unnecessary and unauthorized." On this
hypothesis, the district court's order authorizing the pen registers was a "nullity" and therefore
could not support the further order requiring the Company to provide assistance. 98 S. Ct. at
379 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see text accompanying note 61 supra.
69. See 98 S. Ct. at 370.
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The Supreme Court's conclusion that rule 41 authorizes the use of pen
registers is not supported by a literal reading of the rule itself, which limits
its scope to tangible property. 70 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized in
Katz and in Osborn v. United States71 that nontangibles such as oral
communications can be the objects of a proper search and seizure. 72
Moreover, Congress clearly intended that the permissibility of pen registers
survive the enactment of Title rn. 7 3 Finally, a federal magistrate is already
empowered under Title II to order more intrusive electronic surveillance
that does intercept oral communications. 74 In light of these considerations,
the Court interpreted rule 41 flexibly to effectuate its purpose of prescribing
the requirements of a constitutionally valid search and seizure.
The practical effect of this part of the New York Telephone Co.
decision will be to ensure that the procedural safeguards of rule 41 apply to
pen register orders. 75 The result of noncompliance with those requirements
will be the exclusion of any evidence obtained by means of the surveillance
from use in a criminal prosecution. 76 Problems of construction are certain to
arise because the rule as written is not intended to include nontangible
property. 77 The purpose of deterring unlawful conduct in the area of crimi-
nal investigation will be better served, however, by subjecting the use of pen
registers to the procedures of rule 41 than to none at all. Moreover, when
pen registers are used in conjunction with wiretaps, as they frequently are,
their use arguably will be subject to the even stricter procedures of Title
rff. 78
70. See text accompanying note 33 supra. The Court cited FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) to
support its conclusion, but that rule is inapposite. Rule 57(b) specifically concerns two prob-
lems: the nonconformity of federal criminal procedure to state criminal procedure and the
details of trial procedure; it is not a general grant of authority. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b),
Notes of Advisory Comm.
71. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
72. 389 U.S. at 354-56 & 355 n.16; 385 U.S. at 329-31.
73. See note 29 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; id., Notes of Advisory Comm.
76. "[E]vidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment" and fruits of illegally
seized evidence "cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal search
and seizure." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see FED. R. CalM. P. 41(e).
77. The Court addressed two of these problems in dicta- the notice requirement of rule
41(d) and the requirement that the search be conducted within 10 days-and concluded that
neither barred the use of rule 41 to authorize a pen register order. 98 S. Ct. at 371 n.16.
78. At least one court has held that a pen register is an interception of a wire communica-
tion within the meaning of Title III when used in conjunction with a court-ordered wiretap.
United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 422 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
From the point of view of the telephone company, the Court's characterization of the use
of a pen register as a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment is more
problematic. Because it is now clear that a rule 41 warrant is required to use a pen register in a
criminal investigation, it could be argued that the telephone company's use of pen registers for
business purposes constitutes a violation of the fourth amendment. The telephone company
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Before the Supreme Court's decision that the All Writs Act authorizes a
district court to order a telephone company to provide facilities and technical
assistance in connection with a pen register order, three federal courts of
appeals faced the identical issue;79 of those three, only the Sixth Circuit, in
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., actually held that the All Writs Act em-
powered the district court to order the telephone company to provide
assistance.80 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court failed to
confront the difficult problem raised by Justice Stevens in the dissent:
whether the district court had obtained jurisdiction, apart from the All Writs
Act, over the "dispute" between the FBI and the Company. 81 The Court
evidently assumed that the original jurisdiction exercised by the district
court in authorizing the use of pen registers was sufficient in scope to
include the telephone company whose cooperation was necessary for the
execution of the order, 82 even though the Company was a third party not the
target of the investigation. On the basis of that rationale, however, a district
court could theoretically, upon a mere showing of probable cause, compel
uses pen registers in the normal course of business to check for defective dials and overbilling.
See United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966). They are also used to investigate
annoying or obscene telephone calls. See Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108,
110-11 (1970). See generally Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a
Law Enforcement Tool, supra note 66, at 1029 & n.11. Pen registers, however, are not
prohibited by either Title III or § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 803 of Title
III amended the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (formerly codified at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), to prohibit the interception and divulgence of "any radio communica-
tion." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat.
197 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). Before this amendment to § 605, the Seventh Circuit
had held in Dote that § 605 prohibited the use of pen registers, see 371 F.2d at 181, but that
holding has since been overruled, Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931-32 (7th Cir.
1973). Moreover, unlike Title III, rule 41 confers authority but does not proscribe otherwise
lawful activity. At least one court has held that the use of a pen register by the telephone
company did not violate the subscriber's rights under either the fourth or fifth amendments.
State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1969). It is also clear that there is no bar to the use of
evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons so long as the government played no part in
the unlawful conduct. C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, § 661, at 20. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)
(1970) provides that it is not unlawful for a communication common carrier "to intercept,
disclose, or use that [wire] communication in the normal course of [its] employment."
79. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978);
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976).
80. 565 F.2d at 389. Both the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits held that the All Writs Act
was "analogous" authority to the district court's power to order the telephone company's
assistance to prevent the frustration of its order. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d 243, 246 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); United States v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976). Both Circuits found that the district
court's "inherent authority" to order pen register surveillance extended to the authority to
order the telephone company's assistance. 546 F.2d at 246; 531 F.2d at 811; see note 31 supra.
81. 98 S. Ct. at 380 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 372. Otherwise, the district court would not have met the requirement that
the exercise of authority under the Act be in aid of the court's jurisdiction. See text accompany-
ing notes 60 & 61 supra.
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any unwilling third party, under the threat of contempt, to provide such
assistance as the court in its discretion deemed necessary to effectuate its
order. This proposition is indeed unsettling;8 3 however, the holding in New
York Telephone Co. is substantially more limited.
The Court presented three major justifications for its decision. First,
the Company itself, a regulated public utility, 84 offered no substantial
reasons why it should not provide assistance in investigating the suspected
illegal use of its facilities,8 5 and the order provided that the Company be
compensated at prevailing rates for any assistance that it furnished the
FBI.86 Second, the Company was in the unique position of being able to
deny the FBI the means to carry out its investigation.8 7 Finally, Congress
provided in a 1970 amendment to Title I that a "communication common
carrier" such as the Company can be ordered to provide "information,
facilities, and technical assistance" in connection with electronic surveil-
lance authorized under Title I.88 In light of these circumstances, the Court
understood this to be an extraordinary case that justified an extraordinary
remedy.
The real significance of the New York Telephone Co. decision lies in
its potential to be misinterpreted by the lower federal courts as precedent for
expanding the scope of rule 41 and the All Writs Act. Because the Supreme
Court apparently found that the district court had obtained original juris-
diction over the Company under rule 41, it is possible to read New York
Telephone Co. broadly as sanctioning the use of the All Writs Act to order
any third party to assist in the implementation of a search warrant. If district
courts interpret the decision as authority for invoking the All Writs Act to
83. The Second Circuit expressed its reluctance to approve the district court's order
compelling the Company to provide assistance in the following language:
Perhaps the most important factor weighing against the propriety of the order is that
without Congressional authority, such an order could establish a most undesirable, if
not dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress
unwilling aid on private third parties. . . . In this best of all possible worlds it is a law
of nature that one thing leads to another. It is better not to take the first step.
In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 596, 962 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. 98 S. Ct. at 373. The Sixth Circuit emphasized in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. that "a
telephone company is no ordinary third party. It is a public utility, enjoying a monopoly in an
essential area of communications." 565 F.2d at 389.
85. See 98 S. Ct. at 373. At the same time that Congress amended Title III to empower
district courts to compel communication common carriers to provide assistance in connection
with wiretap orders, it also provided that good faith compliance with such orders is a complete
defense to both criminal and civil liability. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211(a),
(c),,84 Stat. 473 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2520 (1970)). This defense would be
neither available nor necessary in the case of pen registers, because they are not prohibited by
Title III in the first place. See Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of
a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398, 403 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
86. 98 S. Ct. at 373.
87. Id. at 373-74.
88. Id. at 374; see note 8 supra.
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compel tangentially involved third parties to assist in the execution of their
orders, then New York Telephone Co. will be dangerous precedent in the
hands of overzealous law enforcement officials and federal magistrates.
Although clear abuses of discretion should not withstand judicial review, the
results could nonetheless be oppressive. If, however, New York Telephone
Co. is viewed as a pragmatic solution limited to the problem of executing
pen register surveillance in the absence of specific legislation, then the
decision will have little precedential value in other areas of search and
seizure. Several practical considerations militate in favor of the latter in-
terpretation.
First, in criminal investigations that typically involve the use of pen
registers-gambling, racketeering and wirefraud- the evidence obtained
by means of electronic surveillance is essential to successful prosecution.
8 9
Moreover, the ongoing and "professional" nature of such criminal activity
demands sophisticated surveillance techniques. 90 Telephone companies vir-
tually control the means and expertise necessary to conduct such investiga-
tions. As long as they are compensated for providing their services in
connection with pen register surveillance at prevailing rates, they have no
substantial interest to protect by not providing the facilities and assistance.
Second, Congress has already given district courts the power to direct
communication common carriers such as the telephone company to provide
such assistance in connection with court-ordered electronic surveillance
under Title HI. 91 The only reason that pen register surveillance cannot be
enforced under that authority is that in 1968 Congress did not consider pen
registers intrusive enough to be prohibited by Title HI. Common sense
dictates that if a district court can order the telephone company to assist in
executing a wiretap order that intercepts oral communications, it should be
89. See, e.g., United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 608-09 & 608 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975). See
generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 71-74, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 2159-61 (quoting UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201-02 (1967));
Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 835
(1960).
90. For an example of the difficulties encountered in conducting electronic surveillance
against organized criminal activity, see Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 386.
91. See note 8 supra. There are no reported cases challenging the constitutionality of the
1970 amendment to Title III which gave federal magistrates the power to order third parties to
provide assistance. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 21 l(b), 84 Stat. 473 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970)). The constitutionality of Title I1, and particularly § 2518, has been
confirmed. See, e.g., United States v. Fucarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1037-38 (D. Md.), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd mem., 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). It should also be noted that the 1970 amendment extends not
only to communication common carriers but to "landlord[s], custodian[s] or any other
person[s]." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970). Thus, even if the telephone companies have conceded
the validity of the section, there are other parties with potential standing to contest its
constitutionality.
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able to direct the same company to assist in determining the number to
which the intercepted call was placed or from which it originated. 92 Finally,
as the Court itself recognized, federal courts may not impose unreasonable
burdens upon third parties. 93 The use of the All Writs Act is reserved for
truly extraordinary cases and the decision in New York Telephone Co.,
necessitated by a unique and compelling set of circumstances, in no way
modifies that restriction. The Court decided that this was one of the rare
cases in which use of the All Writs Act was justified; however, the obvious
potential for abuse in imposing any burden upon a third party should
demand that such power be used sparingly. In this context, the words of
Judge Mansfield are pertinent: "Were the necessity lesser, or the burden
greater, in some future case, a district court might not be justified in
invoking its extraordinary powers." 9 4 Viewed in this manner, the decision
in New York Telephone Co. represents a judicial solution to a problem that
should eventually be cured by remedial legislation,95 not an expansion of the
scope of authority conferred by either rule 41 or the All Writs Act.
CORNELIUS WESLEY COGHILL, III
92. New York Telephone Co. should logically apply to the use of tracing devices as well as
to the use of pen registers. See note 36 supra.
93. 98 S. Ct. at 372.
94. rn re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 965 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
98 S. Ct. 364 (1977).
95. The problem will not be cured by the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 as it reads in
the present House version of that bill. H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Section 3108(f)
defines "intercept" to mean "to acquire the contents of a communication through the use of an
eavesdropping device," id. § 3108(f), and § 1526(c) of the bill defines "eavesdropping device"
as "an electronic, mechanical, or other device or apparatus that can be used to intercept a
private oral communication," id. § 1526(c). Thus, pen registers would still be outside the scope
of the Act. It should be noted that the bill contains a section identical to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(1970), which empowers a federal magistrate to compel a communication common carrier to
provide assistance in connection with a court-ordered interception. H.R. 6869, § 3105(b)(2),
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
